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ABSTRACT 
 
In 2005, the Securities-related Class Action Act went into force 
in Korea.  Although this Act is similar to the class action rules of the 
United States in many respects, only thirteen securities class action 
cases have been filed in Korea, as of August 2017.  This contrasts 
with the active use of the securities class action observed in the 
United States.  This Comment compares the “law in the books” and 
the “law in practice” in the United States and Korea regarding the 
securities class action, aiming to find some explanation for the dif-
ferences in practice between the two countries. 
I show that there are many similarities between the two coun-
tries’ class action rules, such as the opt-out type class action feature 
and the contingency fee arrangement.  Some differences, such as 
those in fee shifting rules, are mitigated by other rules or through 
innovative maneuvering by the plaintiff’s attorney.  Other differ-
ences that may disfavor plaintiffs in Korea, such as the lack of dis-
covery process, are mitigated by rules that account for the lack of 
such a process, such as rules shifting the burden of proof to the de-
fendant regarding certain elements. 
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After arguing that none of the analyzed factors provide a con-
clusive answer to account for the difference in the use of class ac-
tions, I argue that the difference may be caused by the distinction in 
the filing fee rule.  In Korea, the filing fee escalates gradually in a 
function to the amount-at-stake.  This is not only for the lead plain-
tiff but also for the class members.  So, the lead plaintiff or the lead 
plaintiff’s attorney will have to pay the filing fee not only for herself 
but for other class members.  This rule lowers the incentives of using 
the class action for both the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s attorney. 
I propose using only the alleged amount of the lead plaintiff’s 
amount-at-stake to calculate the filing fee, with a flat fee separately 
required for using the class action system.  This flat fee will be borne 
by the plaintiff’s attorney.  This proposal will have the following 
merits compared to the current rule.  First, this proposal will allow 
the plaintiff to consider only the merits of the class action, without 
taking into account the difference in the filing fee between filing an 
individual action and filing a class action.  Second, it will lower the 
filing fee, thus incentivizing the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s attorney to 
use the class action in securities-related matters.  Last, by using the 
amount-at-stake for the lead plaintiff, it is possible to use the same 
formula that is currently used by courts when calculating the filing 
fee for monetary claims. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In Korea, the Securities-related Class Action Act (“SCAA”) went 
into effect in January 2005.1  The SCAA is intended to establish spe-
cial provisions of Civil Procedure Act of Korea that only apply to 
securities-related class actions.2  The SCAA has many provisions 
that are similar to the U.S. Federal Rule of Civil Procedures 
(“FRCP”) Rule 23.3  For instance, the SCAA adopts an opt-out based 
class action procedure.4 
The scope of the SCAA is narrower than that of the FRCP be-
cause the SCAA allows the use of the class action for only a few 
causes of action.5  However, the SCAA does allow the plaintiff or 
plaintiffs to sue with a few causes of action in the Financial Invest-
ment Services and Capital Markets Act (“FISCMA”) of which some, 
especially Article 179 of the FISCMA (“Article 179”), are comparable 
to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Rule 10b-5 (“Rule 10b-
5”) cause of action in the United States.6 
The Rule 10b-5 cause of action is used extensively in the United 
States.7  But, interestingly, there are almost no claims brought by the 
SCAA in Korea.8 
                                                      
1 JAI YUN LIM, JABONSIJANGBEOBGWA PULKONGJEONGGEORAE [CAPITAL MARKET 
LAW AND UNFAIR TRADE] 541 (2014). 
2 HWA-JIN KIM, JAPONSIJANGBEOB IRON [THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION] 43 (2d ed. 2016). 
3 LIM, supra note 1, at 541. 
4 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action 
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 28 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 
[https://perma.cc/D2JY-NSLW]. 
5 See infra Section 3.2.1. 
6 LIM, supra note 1, at 452. 
7 See infra Section 4. 
8 Only thirteen securities class action cases were filed up until August 31, 2017 
in Korea according to the notices that can be found in the website of the Supreme 
Court of Korea.  Suwon District Court [Dist. Ct.], 2009Ga-Hap8829 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/090427_suwon.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3PG6-BZK3]; Seoul Central Dist. Ct., 2010Ga-Hap1604 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/101231_seoul.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VS5L-3EXT]; Seoul Southern Dist. Ct., 2011Ga-Hap19387 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/111022_slnambu.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/455N-NPTN]; Seoul Southern Dist. Ct., 2011Ga-Hap23003 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/111201_slnambu.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6N75-DE4F]; Seoul Central Dist. Ct., 2012Ga-Hap17061 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/120309_seoul.pdf 
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Various arguments are made about the reasons why the enact-
ment of the SCAA did not result in active filings of securities class 
actions in Korea.  One scholar pointed to the lack of compensation 
for the class representative’s time and effort.9  Another scholar 
pointed to the size of the market capitalization of the Korean listed 
corporations10 and the number of plaintiff’s attorneys in Korea.11  
Another explained that the restraints of the SCAA procedure com-
bined with the general Korean civil procedure work together to dis-
courage the use of the SCAA.12 
                                                      
[https://perma.cc/QD8N-YMVN]; Seoul Central Dist. Ct., 2013Ga-Hap74313 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/131016_seoul.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6JVX-TH42]; Seoul Southern Dist. Ct., 2013Ga-Hap107585 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/131202_slnambu.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9MSB-Z9CR]; Seoul Western Dist. Ct., 2013Ga-Hap35856 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/131204_slseobu.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TAE7-2S3V]; Suwon Dist. Ct., 2013Ga-Hap26404 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/131206_suwon.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JB7H-993G]; Seoul Central Dist. Ct., 2014Ga-Hap31627 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/140626_seoul.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BRU9-9ZLW]; Seoul Central Dist. Ct., 2014Ga-Hap30150 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/140714_seoul.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HA5X-HR5P]; Seoul Western Dist. Ct., 2015Ga-Hap9047 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/170929_seoul.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2VKR-5RNF]; Seoul Western Dist. Ct., 2016Ga-Hap30418 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/160128_slseobu.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DNT7-QN3Y].  Because securities class actions are so infre-
quently filed, it has been said that the SCAA has failed.  See Myungjong Kim, Secu-
rities Class Action System in South Korea; The Failure of ASCA in Korea 38 (2010) (un-
published Master of Laws dissertation, University of Washington) (on file with the 
Gallagher Law Library, University of Washington) (arguing that the SCAA did not 
succeed in taking root in Korea). 
9 See Young-Cheol Jeong, Legal Compliance and Korea’s Financial Services Market: 
A Strategic Approach, 20 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 483, 508 (2011) (“Due in part to a lack 
of compensation for the class representative’s time and efforts, many expect the 
Securities Class Action Act to become a dead letter.”). 
10 See Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 
1465, 1508-10 (2004) (explaining that Korean listed corporations’ relatively small 
market capitalization may negatively affect the incentive to bring a class action 
against them). 
11 See id. at 1516-17 (explaining that the relatively small number of the Korean 
attorneys and their lack of experience in litigating securities class action as plain-
tiff’s lawyers will negatively affect the number of class action filings at least ini-
tially). 
12 See Sheron Korpus, Is Korea’s Securities Class Action Law Working?, 25 INT’L 
FIN. L. REV. 53, 53-54 (2006) (explaining that factors such as the limits on lead plain-
tiff and counsel, limits on size and stake minimums, high up-front costs, lack of 
discovery system, lack of jury system, and fee shifting deters class action filings in 
Korea). 
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This Comment compares some differences between the law of 
Korea and the United States regarding securities class actions.  It co-
vers class action procedures, contingency fee rules, fee shifting rules, 
discovery systems, jury systems, and filing fee rules.13  This Com-
ment tries to show not only the differences in law, but also some of 
the practices used by the lawyers and judges that mitigate the dif-
ferences in practice.  By doing so, I argue that such differences in the 
legal system may not in fact be that different, at least regarding the 
effect on the incentives of the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney.  How-
ever, I find, and suggest a reform to, one substantial obstacle in Ko-
rean law that could be effectively prohibiting the use of the securi-
ties class actions: the filing fee rule. 
This Comment will proceed as follows.  First, I will introduce 
some theories regarding the role of the players who potentially have 
a say in whether to file suit, that is the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s 
counsel, in the enforcement of class action.  I do not intend to make 
any claim here about whether such a role played by each party is a 
positive one.  Rather, I describe the role as it is currently thought to 
be played in the United States.  Second, I will introduce the law re-
garding class action as it stands in the United States and Korea.  Be-
cause many cases are filed as class actions, under Rule 10b-5, in the 
United States, the introduction will focus on rules regarding the 
Rule 10b-5 class action.  But because there is no such concentration 
in Korea, I will generally introduce the substantive law that allows 
the use of the SCAA, followed by an explanation of the SCAA.  
Third, I will introduce the current practice of private enforcements 
on securities class action in the United States and Korea.  While my 
introduction about this practice in the United States will be brief, I 
will go into more details about the practice as it exists in Korea.  The 
Supreme Court of Korea (“SCK”) uses its website to disclose infor-
mation regarding SCAA cases.  This allows me to collect some de-
tails about securities class actions filed in Korea.  Fourth, I will ex-
plain, and compare, the differences between the practice of 
securities litigation in both countries, including the differences in 
each respective country’s civil procedure law and evidence law.  In 
                                                      
13 Similar comparisons using some or all of these factors have been made in 
different contexts.  See, e.g., id. (comparing various aspects of Korean civil procedure 
and SCAA procedure); Manning Gilbert Warren III, The U.S. Securities Fraud Class 
Action: An Unlikely Export to the European Union, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1075, 1085-86 
(2012) (comparing the general civil procedure between the United States and the 
European countries). 
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my comparisons, I will try to focus on how the various parties’ in-
centives in securities class actions are affected by each country’s se-
curities litigation practices.  Said section will cover the differences 
not only between the countries’ class action procedures, but also be-
tween other parts of their legal systems, including their civil proce-
dure laws.  Fifth, I will point to a difference between the two coun-
tries’ civil procedures that seems to account for the difference in 
class action filings: the difference in the filing fee rule.  I will suggest 
a reform to the filing fee rule in Korea that may allow more active 
use of the SCAA class action.  Sixth, I will conclude. 
 
2.  THEORY ON CLASS ACTION ENFORCEMENTS 
 
The class action system, specifically the opt-out type of class ac-
tion system, has a distinguishable feature that allows the action to 
be filed and pursued even in instances where an individual claim-
ant, apart from the class, would not be incentivized to do so, because 
her expense would be higher than the amount she would be able to 
recover.14  The class action works as a tool to overcome the free-rider 
problem and other collective action problems that usually arise in a 
situation where a large number of people have been injured by an-
other person’s conduct, but the injury to many of these individuals 
is, taken in isolation, small.15  The U.S.-type class action mechanism, 
with its distinct characteristics, collectively solves the problem of ad-
dressing these negative value claims — that is, those claims in which 
enforcement cost outweighs the value to the individual claimant.16 
                                                      
14 See James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 497, 497 (1997) (“Where the single claimant could not proceed individually 
because her expenses would dwarf the expected recover, the class action can be 
brought on behalf of all who are similarly situated.”). 
15 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in 
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Re-
form, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8 (1991) (discussing the economic rationale for class ac-
tion). 
16 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 291-92 (2010) (discussing the uniqueness of the U.S. entre-
preneurial litigation system that includes the availability of class action procedure). 
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In the class action context, it may be that any individual plaintiff 
has less at stake in the outcome of the case compared to the plain-
tiff’s counsel.17  This difference in stake between the two could be 
quite sizable.18  And this difference may cause the plaintiff’s counsel 
to act as a principal rather than an agent, regardless of the legal re-
lationship.19  Moreover, in some instances, this system allows the at-
torney to seek out the violation because the attorney may expect to 
be compensated by the contingency fee amplified in a class action.20  
After the plaintiff’s attorney decides to bring suit, the plaintiff’s at-
torney may identify and secure the client to bring suit.21  Even when 
the Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(“PSLRA”) to reform the private enforcement system in 1995, the fo-
cus was on the behavior of plaintiffs’ attorneys.22  For this reason, 
this comment will generally focus on the effect each legal mecha-
nism may have on the incentive of the plaintiff’s attorney, rather 
than the plaintiff, when deciding whether to commence a class ac-
tion. 
 
 
 
                                                      
17 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implication of 
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 
86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677-78 (1986) (explaining that the client of a class action gen-
erally has only a nominal stake in the outcome of a litigation). 
18 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Action: 
Why “Exit” Works Better than “Voice”, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407, 413 (2008) (“Typi-
cally, class counsel expects a contingent fee in the vicinity of 25% of the recovery, 
and no class member will likely own a similar percentage of the defendant’s stock 
to give it an equivalent stake in the action.”). 
19 See id. at 411 (noting that the plaintiff’s attorney can behave less as an agent 
and more as an independent entrepreneur in a class action). 
20 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 17, at 679 (“[B]ecause the attorney as private en-
forcer looks to the court, not the client, to award him a fee if successful, the attorney 
can find the legal violation first and the client second.”). 
21 See id. at 682 (“Once the plaintiff’s attorney has decided to bring suit, identi-
fying and securing a nominal client is often only a necessary procedural step that 
seldom poses a substantial barrier for the experienced professional.”). 
22 See Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Law-
yers: Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1490 
(2006) (noting that all three PSLRA reform tactics are directed at the behavior of 
plaintiff’s lawyers). 
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3.  THE SECURITIES CLASS ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
KOREA:  THE LAW IN THE BOOKS 
 
3.1.  The Rule 10b-5 Class Action in the United States: the Law in the 
Books 
 
A plaintiff who files a Rule 10b-5 class action complaint must 
publish notice within twenty days to other potential class members 
encouraging them to take action.23  Any member of the purported 
class may move to serve as a lead plaintiff within sixty days after the 
date of the publication.24  The court should appoint as lead plaintiff 
the member or members of the purported plaintiff class that it de-
termines to be the most capable of adequately representing the in-
terest of the class members.25  It is the lead plaintiff who usually se-
lects and retains counsel to represent the class.26  The defendants 
may move to dismiss the case.27 
After the motion to dismiss, the case proceeds to the class certi-
fication stage.28  Class action is allowed only if (1) the class is so nu-
merous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are 
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or de-
fenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or de-
fenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class.29  To seek monetary re-
lief, the plaintiffs must also show that (1) questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any questions affect-
ing only individual members, and that (2) a class action is superior 
to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.30 
                                                      
23 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A). 
24 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i)(II). 
25 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i). 
26 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors’ and Offic-
ers’ Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 771 (2009) (explaining 
the mechanism for selecting a lead plaintiff). 
27 FED. R. CIV. P. 12. 
28 MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN & JOHN M. WUNDERLICH, RULE 10B-5 SECURITIES-FRAUD 
LITIGATION 353 (2015). 
29 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
30 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
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It is possible to opt out of a class action that seeks monetary dam-
ages.31  If a party opts out of a securities class action, the party is not 
bound by the class action.32 
 
3.2.  The Securities Related Class Action in Korea: The Law in the 
Books 
 
3.2.1.  Causes of Action Allowed to Use the SCAA 
 
Article 3 of the SCAA allows the use of the act for only a few 
specified causes of action.  They are: (1) claims for damages referred 
to in article 125 of the FISCMA (“Article 125”);33 (2) claims for dam-
ages referred to in article 162 of the FISCMA (“Article 162”) exclud-
ing reports on material facts referred to in article 161 of the FISCMA 
(“Article 161”);34 (3) claim for damages referred to in article 175, 177, 
or 179 of the FISCMA;35 and (4) claims for damages referred to in 
article 170 of the FISCMA (“Article 170”).36  Article 125 concerns the 
false description or representation of a material statement in a reg-
istration statement or an investment prospectus.37  Article 162 con-
cerns false description or representation of a material fact in a busi-
ness report, half-yearly report, quarterly report, or material fact 
report under article 159(1) of the FISCMA (hereinafter referred to as 
“Business Report”) or a document attached thereto (excluding audit 
                                                      
31 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors 
in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1537-
38 (2004) (explaining some effects of the opt-out right to the practice of class action 
law). 
32 KAUFMAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 636. 
33 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action 
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 3 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JY-
NSLW]. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Jabonsijanggwa geumyungtujaeope gwanhan beobryul [Financial Invest-
ment Services and Capital Markets Act], Act No. 8635, Aug. 3, 2007, amended by Act 
No. 14817, Apr. 18, 2017, art. 162 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/자본시장과금융투자업에관한법률 
[https://perma.cc/KY7H-Y9HJ]. 
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reports prepared by an accounting auditor), or due to an omission 
of a description or representation of a material fact therein.38  Article 
175 of the FISCMA (“Article 175”) regulates insider trading.39  Arti-
cle 177 of the FISCMA (“Article 177”) regulates market price manip-
ulation.40  And Article 170 of the FISCMA regulates auditor’s liabil-
ity.41  Article 179 works as a catch-all provision, like Rule 10b-5.42  
Article 179 states that a person who violates Article 178 of FISCMA 
(“Article 178”) shall be liable for damages sustained by a person 
who trades or makes any other transaction in financial investment 
instruments by relying on violation in connection with such trading 
or transaction.43  And Article 178 regulates various actions to deter 
fraud; it includes a clause stating that no one may employ any de-
vice, scheme, or artifice in connection with trading (including public 
offering, private placement, and sale in case of securities) or other 
transaction of financial investment instruments, of which the word-
ing is an attempt to translate the wording of Rule 10b-5 into Ko-
rean.44 
                                                      
38  Japonsijanggwa geumyungtujaeope gwanhan beobyul [Financial Invest-
ment Services and Capital Markets Act], Act No. 8635, Aug. 3, 2007, amended by Act 
No. 14817, Apr. 18, 2017, art. 162 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/자본시장과금융투자업에관한법률 
[https://perma.cc/KY7H-Y9HJ]. 
39  Japonsijanggwa geumyungtujaeope gwanhan beobyul [Financial Invest-
ment Services and Capital Markets Act], Act No. 8635, Aug. 3, 2007, amended by Act 
No. 14817, Apr. 18, 2017, art. 175 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/자본시장과금융투자업에관한법률 
[https://perma.cc/KY7H-Y9HJ]. 
40  Japonsijanggwa geumyungtujaeope gwanhan beobyul [Financial Invest-
ment Services and Capital Markets Act], Act No. 8635, Aug. 3, 2007, amended by Act 
No. 14817, Apr. 18, 2017, art. 177 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/자본시장과금융투자업에관한법률 
[https://perma.cc/KY7H-Y9HJ]. 
41  Japonsijanggwa geumyungtujaeope gwanhan beobyul [Financial Invest-
ment Services and Capital Markets Act], Act No. 8635, Aug. 3, 2007, amended by Act 
No. 14817, Apr. 18, 2017, art. 170 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/자본시장과금융투자업에관한법률 
[https://perma.cc/KY7H-Y9HJ]. 
42  See LIM, supra note 1, at 536. 
43  Japonsijanggwa geumyungtujaeoppe gwanhan beobyul [Financial Invest-
ment Services and Capital Markets Act], Act No. 8635, Aug. 3, 2007, amended by Act 
No. 14817, Apr. 18, 2017, art. 179 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/자본시장과금융투자업에관한법률 
[https://perma.cc/KY7H-Y9HJ]. 
44  See LIM, supra note 1, at 466. 
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The SCK has interpreted Article 178(1)1 to mean: all device, 
scheme, or artifice that is deemed socially unfair.45  The SCK said 
that the test for determining what unfair means is: whether the act 
is forbidden by the law, or whether the act makes other investors 
make wrong decisions, so that it hurts fair competition and shifts 
monetary harm to good investors, which in turn leads to damaging 
the fairness, integrity and efficiency of the capital market.46  And to 
determine whether an act comprises an unfair act that is prohibited 
by Article 178, one must consider factors such as, but not limited to, 
the structure of the financial investment product in question, the 
method of the transaction, the circumstances of the transaction, the 
particularity of the market in which the financial investment prod-
uct is traded, the terms of rights and obligations of the investor, the 
period of termination of the rights and obligations, the relation be-
tween the actor and the investor, and circumstances of the time of, 
before, and after the action.47  According to the SCK’s interpretation, 
it is possible to say that Article 179 is a catch-all provision intended 
to deter unfair actions in the securities market.48 
 
3.2.2.  The SCAA Procedures 
 
The claim for damages by the SCAA may be filed when damages 
result from trade or other securities transactions issued by a stock-
listed corporation.49  Because the SCAA only allows certain causes 
of action, as seen above, other causes of action, including tort in the 
Civil Act of Korea may not be raised in the procedure.50 
Anyone who wants to be considered a lead plaintiff in the class 
action should file a complaint with an application asking for permis-
sion to use class action under the SCAA.51  A claimant who may be 
                                                      
45 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2013Do4064, Jan. 16, 2014 (S. Kor.). 
46 S. Ct. 2013Do4064, Jan. 16, 2014 (S. Kor.). 
47 S. Ct. 2013Ma1052 & 1053 (consol.), Apr. 9, 2015 (S. Kor.). 
48 LIM, supra note 1, at 452. 
49 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action 
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 3 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JY-
NSLW]. 
50 LIM, supra note 1, at 545. 
51 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action 
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 7 (S. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/6
  
2017] Saving the Korean Securities Class Action 259 
considered to be the lead plaintiff should be deemed a class member 
who can represent the interests of the class fairly and appropriately, 
such as a person who is a class member with the largest economic 
benefit in the class action among the members.52  The plaintiff’s at-
torney should also be a person who can represent the interests of the 
class fairly and appropriately.53  A person who has been involved in 
three or more securities-related class actions as a lead plaintiff or 
lead plaintiff’s attorney during the preceding three years may not be 
a lead plaintiff or lead plaintiff’s attorney unless the court finds that, 
considering the circumstances, the person has met the requirements 
listed above.54 
The court shall, within ten days after receiving the complaint 
and application, give public notice of: (1) the fact that a class action 
has been filed; (2) the alleged scope of the class; (3) the alleged claim 
and the summary of the counts; and (4) a notice that any class mem-
ber who intends to be the lead plaintiff should file an application 
within thirty days from the notice.55  The claimant shall pay for the 
notice to the court in advance.56  The court shall, within fifty days 
from the date of publicizing the notice above, appoint a person who 
is deemed to be the most appropriate person to represent the inter-
ests of the class as a lead plaintiff from among those who meet the 
requirements to be the lead plaintiff, as explained above, and who 
either initially filed the complaint or filed an application to be the 
lead plaintiff.57 
                                                      
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JY-
NSLW]. 
52 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action 
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 11 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JY-
NSLW]. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action 
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 10 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JY-
NSLW]. 
56 Jeunggwongwanryeonjipdansosonggyuchik [Rule on the Securities-related 
Class Action], S. Ct. Rule No. 1916, Dec. 29, 2004, art. 4 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송규칙 [https://perma.cc/WTM9-
75ZD]. 
57 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action 
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 10 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JY-
NSLW]. 
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When multiple plaintiffs file complaints under the SCAA, the 
court shall consolidate the cases.58  In this case, the court may ap-
point the lead plaintiff and lead plaintiff’s attorney after listening to 
opinions of the plaintiffs or the class members who applied to be the 
lead plaintiff.59 
For a case to proceed as a class action, the plaintiffs must meet 
the following requirements.  First, there should be at least fifty class 
members with the sum of the securities held by the class members 
being at least 1/10,000 of the total number of the outstanding secu-
rities of the defendant corporation at the time of conduct which is 
the ground for the claim.60  This requirement need only be met at the 
time of the filing.61  Second, there should be a material legal or fac-
tual issue for a claim, allowed the use of the SCAA, that is common 
to all class members.62  Third, class action should be a suitable and 
efficient means to realize the rights of the class members or protect 
their interests.63  Finally, there should be no defects on the applica-
tion for class action or its accompanying documents.64 
The court shall allow the case to proceed as class action only if 
the court finds that the requirements have been met.65  The court 
should issue an order to prepay necessary costs, such as costs for 
notice to the individuals, announcement to the public, and hiring an 
                                                      
58 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action 
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 14 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JY-
NSLW]. 
59 Id. 
60 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action 
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 12 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JY-
NSLW]. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action 
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 12 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JY-
NSLW]. 
64 Id. 
65 See Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Ac-
tion Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 
15 (S. Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 
[https://perma.cc/D2JY-NSLW]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/6
  
2017] Saving the Korean Securities Class Action 261 
expert for appraisal, when allowing the class to proceed as class ac-
tion.66  Both of the decisions — to allow class action and to deny class 
action — may be appealed.67  If the decision not to allow proceeding 
as class action is conclusive and beyond appeal, the case will be 
deemed as if not filed.68 
When the decision to allow proceeding as class action is conclu-
sive and beyond appeal, the court should give notice about certain 
information regarding the class action: including, but not limited to, 
the name and address of the lead plaintiff and defendant, the name 
and address of the lead plaintiff’s counsel, the scope the class, the 
claim, the procedure and period for opting out of the class, the fact 
that an opted-out member may sue individually, the fact that class 
members who do not opt out will be legally bound by the decision 
made by the court, the fact that class members can replace lead 
plaintiff with permission from the court, and the information re-
garding fee contract of the lead counsel.69  The court may ask the 
lead plaintiff, defendant, or the stock exchange, for the name and 
address of the class members, to send the notices by ordinary mail.70  
The court should also make the requisite announcement above by 
newspaper that is distributed nationwide.71 
                                                      
66  Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action 
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 16 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JY-
NSLW]. 
67 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action 
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 15 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JY-
NSLW]; Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action 
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 17 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JY-
NSLW]. 
68 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action 
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 17 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JY-
NSLW]. 
69 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action 
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 18 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JY-
NSLW]. 
70 Jeunggwongwanryeonjipdansosonggyuchik [Rule on the Securities-related 
Class Action], S. Ct. Rule No. 1916, Dec. 29, 2004, art. 15 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송규칙 [https://perma.cc/WTM9-
75ZD]. 
71 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action 
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 18 (S. 
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Class members may opt out of the class action before the end of 
the opt-out period on the notice above.72  The final and conclusive 
decision made by the court binds all class members who did not opt 
out.73  After the class certification stage, the case will proceed to the 
trial stage, where the court will consider the merits of the case. 
 
4.  THE U.S. SECURITIES CLASS ACTION:  THE LAW IN PRACTICE 
 
In the United States, 189 new federal securities class action suits 
have been filed in 2015, meaning 4% of U.S. exchange-listed compa-
nies were subject to such filings.74  The plaintiff’s attorneys earned 
more than fourteen billion dollars in fees and expenses from securi-
ties litigation during the period between 1997 and 2013.75  In 2014, 
the total settlement amount was more than one billion dollars.76  Of 
the cases filed in 2015, about 84% included Rule 10b-5 claims.77  And 
                                                      
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JY-
NSLW]. 
72 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action 
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 28 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JY-
NSLW]. 
73 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action 
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 37 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JY-
NSLW]. 
74 Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Filings—2015 Year in Review 1 
(2016), http://securities.stanford.edu/research-reports/1996-2015/Cornerstone-
Research-Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2015-YIR.pdf [https://perma.cc/99ER-
P2T8]. 
75 Joseph A. Grundfest, Damages and Reliance Under Section 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act, 69 BUS. LAW. 307, 308-09 (Feb. 2014). 
76 Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Settlements—2014 Review and 
Analysis 1 (2015), https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/701f936e-ab1d-
425b-8304-8a3e063abae8/Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2014-Review-and-
Analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L8Y-KBA6]. 
77 Cornerstone Research, supra note 74, at 8. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/6
  
2017] Saving the Korean Securities Class Action 263 
almost all of the allegations in the claims filed included misrepre-
sentation in the financial documents.78  But the possibility of the au-
ditor being named as defendant in the United States is quite low.79 
Not many cases actually go to trial because most cases are either 
dismissed or settled.80  According to one study, only twenty-one 
cases have gone to trial and only fifteen cases have reached a verdict 
or judgment out of 4,435 securities class action suits filed between 
the enactment of PSLRA and December 31th, 2014.81  No trial was 
held in 2015.82  Another study found that, of securities law cases 
seeking damages from 1980 to 2005, only thirty-seven cases were 
tried to judgment against public companies, their officers and direc-
tors, or both.83 
 
5.  THE SECURITIES CLASS ACTION OF KOREA:  THE LAW IN PRACTICE 
 
5.1.  General Introductions on Filing of Class Actions in Korea 
 
As of August 31, 2017, thirteen SCAA cases have been filed in 
the courts of Korea.84  The SCK gives notices on those cases on its 
                                                      
78 Id. (finding 99% of the filed securities class action cases contained misrepre-
sentation in the financial documents). 
79 Id. (finding that the percentage of the auditor being named in securities class 
action cases that has been filed each year in the United States did not rise above 3% 
between 2011 and 2015). 
80 Michael Klausner, Jason Hegland & Matthew Goforth, When Are Securities 
Class Actions Dismissed, When Do They Settle, and for How Much? An Update, 23 PLUS 
1 (April. 2013). 
81 Renzo Comolli & Svetlana Starykh, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action 
Litigation: 2014 Full-Year Review 36 (2015), http://www.nera.com/con-
tent/dam/nera/publications/2015/PUB_2014_Trends_0115.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QB3Y-MAF6]. 
82 Svetlana Starykh & Stefan Boettrich, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action 
Litigation: 2015 Full-Year Review 38 (2016) http://www.nera.com/con-
tent/dam/nera/publications/2016/2015_Securities_Trends_Report_NERA.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8VNX-MTSN]. 
83 Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 
58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1064 (2006). 
84  See supra note 8 (listing cases filed). 
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website,85 which may be used to follow the case docket summary of 
each case, also accessible on its website.86  I have summarized the 
cases in appendix Table A (“Appendix A”). 
Of the thirteen SCAA cases, two were consolidated because they 
concerned the same facts, but involved different defendants.87  An-
other three cases were consolidated because they also concerned the 
same facts, but with different defendants.88  So, the actual case count 
is ten.  Of the ten cases, two have been settled.89  And one court 
found for the plaintiffs.90  The other cases are still pending, at vari-
ous stages, with some courts granting certification.91 
None of the lead plaintiffs in the SCAA cases seem to be institu-
tional investors, such as mutual funds or pension funds.92  Most of 
the plaintiffs were individuals, with only a few corporations joining 
the individuals as plaintiffs.93  Some cases were filed with multiple 
plaintiffs, with one case having over 1,000 plaintiffs.94 
Regarding the plaintiff’s counsel, it is interesting to note that the 
lawyers who had been the first to make use of the SCAA and who 
had succeeded in managing the case until the end did not engage in 
any other class actions.95  One firm, Hannuri Law, holds six cases, and 
two different law firms hold one case each.96  The lead plaintiff in 
                                                      
85 Sup. Ct. S. Kor., Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosong, 
http://www.scourt.go.kr/portal/notice/securities/securities.jsp 
[https://perma.cc/9FGF-Y2GX]. 
86 Sup. Ct. S. Kor., Nauisageongeomsaek, http://www.scourt.go.kr/portal/in-
formation/events/search/search.jsp [https://perma.cc/3GNP-Z992]. 
87 See infra Appendix A. 
88 See id. 
89 See Yeongkil Jo, Bunbaejongryobogoseo [Report on Final Distributions] (Jan. 
30, 2012), http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/120130_suwon.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ESU3-T5TG]; Seoul Central Dist. Ct., Gonggo [Notice] (Feb. 10, 
2017), http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/170210_seoul.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LA4M-NXG5]. 
90 See Seoul Central Dist. Ct., 2012Ga-Hap17061, Jan. 20, 2017 (S. Kor.). 
91 See infra Appendix A. 
92 See id. 
93 See id. 
94 See id.  In the United States, aggregation of plaintiffs was a method used by 
counsel to secure the position of lead counsel.  See Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, 
and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 63-64 (2001).  However, this may not be the case here, because 
there were no competing filings for lead plaintiff in cases filed in Korean courts.  See 
infra Appendix A. 
95 See infra Appendix A. 
96 See id. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/6
  
2017] Saving the Korean Securities Class Action 265 
one of the two consolidated cases is being counseled by two differ-
ent law firms, and of the two law firms, one had a lawyer, Park Pil-
seo, who left Hannuri Law to join it at the time the class action was 
filed.97  Since then, the lawyer, Park Pilseo, has rejoined Hannuri 
Law.98  Of the law firms involved in these SCAA cases, only Hannuri 
Law seems to define itself as a plaintiff’s law firm, according to its 
website.99 
There are differences between the cases regarding the character-
istics of the defendants.  The first case that has been filed as a class 
action had two directors as codefendants, but the plaintiffs volun-
tarily dismissed the cases against them before the settlement.100  In 
every case where the lead counsel is Hannuri Law, the plaintiffs 
named the corporation as the only defendant.101  But in other cases, 
the plaintiffs have named individuals also as codefendants.102 
 
5.2.  The First Case 
 
The first class action case under the SCAA was filed in 2009.103  
The plaintiffs were a private equity fund and its director, and the 
defendants were a corporation, whose stocks were traded on the 
Kosdaq market, and its directors.104  The plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendant corporation omitted a huge loss incurred to the corpora-
tion by a certain derivative product from the financial statement, 
causing the financial statement to show net profit instead of net loss, 
                                                      
97 See id. 
98 See id. 
99 HANNURI LAW, http://www.hannurilaw.co.kr [http://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20170930213248/http://www.hannurilaw.co.kr/] (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2017); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Globalization of Entrepreneurial Litiga-
tion: Law, Culture, and Incentives, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1895, 1915 (2017) (noting that 
“one law firm has brought the majority of securities class actions filed in South Ko-
rea.”). 
100  See infra Appendix A. 
101  See id. 
102  See id. 
103  See Suwon Dist. Ct., Jeunggwongwanryeonjipdansosongui sojegi gonggo [No-
tice on Filing of Securities-related Class Action] (Apr. 29, 2009), 
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/090427_suwon.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X37T-9KL4]. 
104  Suwon Dist. Ct., 2009Ka-Gi1048, Jan. 21, 2010 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/100203_suwon.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TYZ6-AFWE]. 
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and that the class members bought the stocks of the corporation be-
cause they relied on the disclosed financial statement.105  This alleg-
edly resulted in a loss for the plaintiffs that should be compensated 
by the defendants.106 
The court decided to permit the case to proceed as a class action 
on January 21, 2010, while allowing class members to opt out until 
March 26, 2010.107  The scope of the class members was: members 
who were certified as stock holders of the corporation as of Decem-
ber 19, 2008, and who bought the stock from the period of August 
14, 2008, when the corporation made the alleged misrepresentation, 
to December 19, 2008, when the corporation made the adjustment.108  
During the opt-out period, fifteen class members chose to opt out.109 
The case was permitted to settle on April 30, 2010, which is about 
a year after the case was first filed.110  With regards to the terms of 
settlement, the corporation initially agreed to pay 2,900,000,000 
won,111 half in cash and the rest in its treasury stock.112  But because 
fifteen class members chose to opt out, the settlement resulted in the 
corporation agreeing to pay 1,371,696,201 won and treasury stock of 
199,664 that amounts to 2,743,392,402 won, to the rest of the class 
members.113  Each party agreed to pay for its own legal fees.114  On 
                                                      
105 Suwon Dist. Ct., supra note 103. 
106 Id. 
107 Suwon Dist. Ct., Sosongheogagyeoljeong gojiseo [Notice on Decision to Permit 
Class Action Proceeding] (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/no-
tice/100203_suwon_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4B5-FJT2]. 
108 Suwon Dist. Ct., 2009Ka-Gi1048, Jan. 21, 2010 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/100203_suwon.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FA8Z-E8RQ]. 
109 Suwon Dist. Ct., 2009Ga-Hap8829, Apr. 30, 2010 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/20100430_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3R3-
ZJ2P]. 
110 Id. 
111 This amount is approximately 2,617,329 U.S. dollars calculated by the cur-
rency exchange rate of 1,108 won per one U.S. dollar as of April 30, 2010.  For the 
currency exchange rate as of April 30, 2010, see Foreign Exchange Rates: Historical 
Rates for the South Korean Won, FED. RES. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/re-
leases/h10/hist/dat00_ko.htm [https://perma.cc/B26R-J5HV]. 
112 Suwon Dist. Ct., 2009Ga-Hap8829, Apr. 30, 2010 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/20100430_01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AAT2-8726]. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
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July 14, 2010, the court decided to choose one of the plaintiff’s coun-
sels as the distribution administrator.115  The distribution adminis-
trator submitted the distribution plan on August 6, 2010, which the 
court granted on September 30, 2010, with only a few modifica-
tions.116  The court granted to the plaintiff’s counsel fees that 
amounted to 20% of the settlement, that is 274,339,240 won,117 and 
treasury stock of 39,932.118  The cost incurred during the proceeding 
that included filing fee, fee for sending individual notice and fee for 
public notice (10,878,710 won), was to be deducted from the settle-
ment amount.119  Because the plaintiff’s counsel also undertook the 
position of distribution administrator, the cost and fee for the distri-
bution would be paid to the plaintiff’s counsel.120  However, the 
plaintiff’s counsel agreed not to be paid a fee for the distribution, 
nor be reimbursed the cost of the distribution, which the court esti-
mated to be approximately 90,898,250 won.121 
The notice announcing the ending of the distribution was made 
public on January 30, 2012.122  According to the notice, 134,720 stocks 
and 926,956,248 won have been distributed to the class members.123  
The rest of the stocks, and the money, were returned to the defend-
ant.124 
 
 
                                                      
115 Suwon Dist. Ct., 2009Ga-Hap8829, July 14, 2010 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/100714_suwon.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VQQ9-ZPXR]. 
116 Suwon Dist. Ct., 2009Ga-Hap8829, Sept. 30, 2010 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/100930_suwon.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YZN8-4QU5]. 
117 This amount is approximately 247,599 U.S. dollars calculated by the cur-
rency exchange rate of 1,108 won per one U.S. dollar as of April 30, 2010.  For data 
on currency exchange rate as of April 30, 2010, see FED. RES. SYS., supra note 111. 
118 Suwon Dist. Ct., 2009Ga-Hap8829, Sept. 30, 2010 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/100930_suwon.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V8MH-5RWF]. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Jo, supra note 89. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
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5.3.  Decisions by the Lower Courts 
 
Currently five cases have proceeded to the trial stage.125  I have 
summarized the current statuses of the cases in appendix Table B 
(“Appendix B”).126  As discussed earlier, only two cases have been 
settled, and one court found for the plaintiffs.127  The rest of the cases 
are still pending at various stages.128 
The courts have so far been quite willing to interpret the require-
ments to allow certification.129  One court was content to find the 
commonality requirement met when the alleged cause of action of 
the plaintiffs was about Article 179.130  Another court found com-
monality in an Article 125 case because the materiality element and 
loss causation element were both common to all class members.131  
The court went on to say that the fact that a certain subset of the class 
members may have an affirmative defense to the claim is not enough 
to deny the commonality requirement in an Article 125 class ac-
tion.132  Moreover, regarding the suitability requirement, the courts 
found: the loss to the individual plaintiff being small is enough to 
find that the plaintiffs may not be expected to file a suit individually, 
which makes the class action a suitable and efficient alternative.133 
 
 
                                                      
125 See infra Appendix B. 
126 In Korea, the case regarding petition for class certification and the case re-
garding actual complaint are given separate case numbers.  When the case for class 
certification is appealed the case number for class certification will change accord-
ingly.  However, the case number for the claim itself, in principle, will stay the 
same. 
127 Seoul Central Dist. Ct., 2012Ga-Hap17061, Jan. 20, 2017 (S. Kor.); Jo, supra 
note 89; Seoul Central Dist. Ct., supra note 89. 
128 See infra Appendix A. 
129 Although some lower courts have denied certification, they were over-
turned. See Appendix B.  Currently only one case, which has been appealed, has 
been denied certification.  See Appendix B. 
130 See Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct]., 2015Ra619, Jan. 29, 2016 (S. Kor.). 
131 See Seoul High Ct., 2013Ra20093, Feb. 6, 2015 (S. Kor.). 
132 Id. 
133 Seoul High Ct., 2015Ra656 & 657 (consol.), Nov. 16, 2016 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/151117_slgodung.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NZY7-PMYA]. 
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6.  THE COMPARISON 
 
The difference in practice between Korea and the United States 
is quite striking.  In the United States, nearly 200 cases are filed every 
year with over a billion dollars at stake.  In Korea, on average, fewer 
than one SCAA case was filed every year, and only three cases re-
sulted in settlements or a final decision by the court in the eleven 
years since the enactment of the SCAA.134  While it may be too early 
to tell, although eleven years since enactment of the SCAA is not a 
short period, the current practice in Korea could mean that the im-
plementation of an opt-out type class action system, standing alone, 
may not be enough to encourage private enforcement. 
In this section, I will compare some differences between the civil 
procedures of the two countries that may be affecting the difference 
in practice.  The first part will focus on the specific rules pertaining 
to the class action, while the second part will consider the differ-
ences more broadly by including the differences in general civil pro-
cedure mechanics. 
 
6.1.  Comparing the Class Action Procedures 
 
6.1.1.  The Requirements at the Class Certification Stage 
 
As discussed above, FRCP 23 requires predominance for the 
class certification of a Rule 10b-5 class action.135  This requirement 
allows the court to exercise considerable discretion in determining 
what causes of action are suitable on their facts for class-wide deter-
mination.136  In the Rule 10b-5 class action context, the Supreme 
Court of the United States (“SCOTUS”) decided that the reliance re-
quirement needs to be investigated at the class certification stage.137  
                                                      
134 See infra Appendix A. 
135 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
136 Coffee, Jr., supra note 16, at 299. 
137 Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion After Halliburton, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 895, 910-11 (2013). 
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Expert witnesses are used to prove not only reliance, but also mate-
riality and loss causation.138  The court, by using the fraud-on-the-
market theory as a basis for allowing presumption of reliance, 
turned the reliance inquiry into an analysis of market efficiency.139 
So, how do you prove market efficiency?  SCOTUS was not clear 
on this point, so it was left to the lower courts to find an appropriate 
test to determine whether a security was traded in an efficient mar-
ket.140  No uniform test has been accepted by the lower courts.141  In 
Cammer v. Bloom, the court discussed the following factors as rele-
vant to determining market efficiency for a given security: (1) eligi-
bility to file an SEC form S-3, (2) average weekly trading volume, (3) 
analyst coverage, (4) existence of market makers and arbitrageurs, 
and (5) price reaction to company-specific information.142  Accord-
ingly, class certification in the United States requires the use and ex-
penditure of various resources, including hiring expert witness for 
the plaintiff.143 
Although it may be too early to tell, this might not be the case in 
Korea.  As is shown above, there is no predominance requirement 
in Korea.  Furthermore, the court is not explicitly required to inquire 
into reliance or market efficiency at the class certification stage.144  
Conflicts between the parties during the class certification stage cen-
ter around the question of whether the alleged claim should be al-
lowed to proceed by the SCAA as a matter of law.  The courts do not 
                                                      
138 See Jonah B. Gelbach, Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, Valid Inference in Sin-
gle-Firm, Single-Event Studies, 15 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 495, 501 (2013) (“Plaintiffs 
seeking to meet the reliance, materiality, and loss causation elements of a securities 
fraud case can use event study evidence to establish that a security’s price move-
ment was associated with allegedly fraudulent statements.”). 
139 Fisch, supra note 137, at 897. 
140 See Jeffrey L. Oldham, Taking “Efficient Markets” out of the Fraud-on-the-Mar-
ket Doctrine After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 
1015 (2003). 
141 See id. (“Yet no particular test or set of factors has been universally accepted 
by a majority of courts across the country.”). 
142 See Paul A. Ferrillo, Frederick C. Dunbar & David Tabak, The “Less Than” 
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis: Requiring More Proof From Plaintiffs in Fraud-on-
the-Market Cases, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 81, 90-93 (2004). 
143 See KAUFMAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 355 (“In addition, an expert is vital at 
class certification. An expert may be able to perform the necessary event study at 
class certification and demonstrate common issues, such as reliance and loss causa-
tion.”). 
144 See, e.g., Seoul High Ct., 2015Ra619, Jan. 29, 2016 (S. Kor.) (certifying class 
without any mention of market efficiency). 
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seem to require any reports by expert witnesses to make this deter-
mination.145  Although the SCAA requires the plaintiff to prepay 
necessary costs, such as costs for notice, announcement, and ap-
praisal, the prepayment is required only when it becomes definite 
by the order of the court that the case will proceed as a class action.146 
These differences in class certification procedures between the 
United States and Korea can be quite significant.  Because the plain-
tiff’s counsel in the United States expends a significant amount of 
resources in the class certification stage, the risk of not getting a class 
certification after spending so much time, and expending so many 
resources, must be seriously considered.  But in Korea, the plaintiff’s 
counsel has the advantage of waiting for the class to be certified be-
fore expending such resources.147  All things being equal, this differ-
ence in procedure arguably should incentivize plaintiff’s counsel in 
Korea to file a class action claim more actively, when compared to 
its U.S. counterparts. 
 
6.1.2.  Restriction on Cases the Plaintiff’s Counsel May File 
 
As was discussed above, there are limitations as to how many 
cases a plaintiff’s counsel may file as class actions under the SCAA 
                                                      
145 See, e.g., Seoul High Ct., 2015Ra619, Jan. 29, 2016 (S. Kor.) (certifying class 
without any mention of expert witness opinion). 
146 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action 
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 16 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JY-
NSLW]. 
147 The courts differ on the amount to be prepaid.  Compare Seoul High Ct., 
2015Ra656 & 657 (consol.), Nov. 16, 2016 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/151117_slgodung.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NZY7-PMYA], and Seoul High Ct., 2015Ra619, Jan. 29, 2016 (S. 
Kor.) (ordering prepayment of 40,000,000 won, which consists of fee for sending 
notice 10,000,000 won, fee for giving notice newspaper etc. 20,000,000 won, fee for 
appraisal 5,000,000 won and other fees 5,000,000 won), with Seoul Southern Dist. 
Ct., 2011Ka-Gi2010, Sept. 27, 2013 (S. Kor.) (ordering prepayment of 51,000,000 won, 
which consists of fee for sending notice 16,000,000 won, fee for giving notice news-
paper etc. 20,000,000 won, fee for appraisal 10,000,000 won and other fees 5,000,000 
won).  The court will return the unused amount of the prepaid fees when the case 
settles or otherwise ends.  See Suwon Dist. Ct., 2009Ga-Hap8829, Sept. 30, 2010 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/100930_suwon.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MH45-U9XW]. 
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during a given time period in Korea.148  The clause does not specify 
whether the lawyer as an individual or a firm is subject to the re-
striction, leaving this to the courts for interpretation.149  But, there is 
no such restriction in the United States, which allows the plaintiff’s 
attorney to file multiple cases in an attempt to diversify.150 
This difference in regulation may partially affect plaintiff’s attor-
neys’ limitations to diversifying litigation risks.  In the United States, 
plaintiff’s attorneys, as repeat players of litigation, may be able to 
diversify litigation risk by choosing to handle multiple cases, alt-
hough somewhat to the lesser degree when compared to securities 
investors.151  But Korean attorneys may be less capable of diversify-
ing the litigation risk by holding multiple class actions, because they 
may only be involved in three cases over the past three years.152  Risk 
aversion could be difficult to address in this kind of legal frame-
work, accounting for the fact the many attorneys may decide not to 
pursue class actions.153 
However, bringing multiple class actions is not the only means 
by which plaintiff’s attorneys diversify.  Attorneys in Korea may di-
versify by representing non-class-action cases as well.154  Moreover, 
as we have seen above, one firm, Hannuri Law, currently holds six 
cases that are still pending in various courts.155  The defendant in 
one of the cases has petitioned for disqualification of Hannuri Law 
                                                      
148 See Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Ac-
tion Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 
11 (S. Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 
[https://perma.cc/D2JY-NSLW]. 
149 Id. 
150 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 17, at 705. 
151 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 17, at 705 (“Phrased more generally, portfolio di-
versification is a strategy that permits the plaintiff’s attorney, much as any investor, 
to reduce the variance associated with an expected return.”). 
152  Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action 
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 11 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JY-
NSLW]. 
153 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model 
of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 280-81 (1983) (ex-
plaining that risk aversion affects the attorney’s litigation strategy). 
154 Restriction of multiple class action filings do not fully limit the power to 
diversify because the plaintiff’s attorney is free to retain other kinds of cases.  I 
thank Professor Rock for pointing this out to me. 
155 See infra Appendix A. 
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for this reason.156  But the court decided that, considering the firm’s 
past experience in litigating securities related claims, the firm is 
deemed to be able to fairly and appropriately represent the total 
class members, allowing it to remain as counsel.157 
The decision made by the lower court in effect may lower the 
hurdle imposed on the plaintiff’s attorney, because by its logic, the 
experience of handling securities class action cases qualifies as a rea-
son for excepting the allowed limit to the number of cases a plain-
tiff’s counsel may file in a given period.  If the SCK affirms the lower 
court’s holding on this issue, then the gap between the United States 
and Korea may effectively be narrowed.158 
 
6.2.  Comparing the General Civil Procedure Process 
 
6.2.1.  Rule on Contingency Fees 
 
Contingent fee arrangement is one of the key legal rules that al-
lows lawyers in the United States to act as private attorneys gen-
eral.159  But many countries around the world do not allow contin-
gency fee arrangements, thereby discouraging active 
entrepreneurial litigation filed by plaintiffs’ attorneys.160  This is not 
the case in Korea.  Until recently, the SCK found contingent fee ar-
rangements between parties to be effective in principle.161  The SCK 
decided that a contingent fee arrangement regarding a criminal case 
is void for public policy reasons in 2015.162  But the SCK made it clear 
that a contingent fee arrangement for a civil case should be al-
lowed.163  So, of the critical factors that allow plaintiff’s counsel to 
                                                      
156 Seoul High Ct., 2015Ra619, 14-15, Jan. 29, 2016 (S. Kor.). 
157 Id. 
158 The SCK did affirm the case, but did not specifically address the issue.  See 
S. Ct., 2016Ma251, May 27, 2016 (S. Kor.). 
159 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 17, at 667-70. 
160 See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION 199 (2015) (“Most 
countries also prohibit private attorneys from charging fees based on the amount 
of the damages obtained, thereby barring ‘entrepreneurial litigation’ (at least to the 
extent that the attorney serves as the entrepreneur).”). 
161 S. Ct., 2015Da200111, July 23, 2015 (S. Kor.). 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
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act as an entrepreneur, one is not much different between the two 
countries.164 
 
6.2.2.  Rule on Fee Shifting 
 
Fee shifting rules may also affect the use of class action litigation, 
because fee shifting may chill litigation.165  On the other hand, the 
American rule, wherein each party is required to pay for its own 
legal fees without regard to the outcome of the case, may encourage 
the filing of litigation.166 
In the United States, each party to a litigation typically pays its 
own legal fees.167  But in Korea, the fee is usually shifted to the losing 
party.168 
However, it should be noted that the costs paid or prepaid by 
the plaintiff’s counsel, such as filing fees, costs for individual notice, 
costs for public announcement, and costs for appraisal, will also be 
shifted to the defendant in the event that the plaintiff wins.169  So, if 
the fee shifting rule deters cases, it may deter more cases without 
merit than cases with merit.170 
We should also note that there is a cap on the amount of attor-
ney’s fees that may be shifted in Korea.171  The cap is calculated by a 
function of the amount-at-stake and the fee awarded (or promised 
                                                      
164 Different types of contingent fee arrangements may affect the incentives of 
the plaintiff’s counsel differently resulting in different behaviors.  See generally, John 
C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litiga-
tion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 33-48 (1985) (explaining the different behaviors 
of the plaintiff’s counsel under compensatory schemes which compensate time 
spent and under compensatory schemes which compensates by a function of recov-
ered loss). 
165 See COFFEE, JR., supra note 160, at 84. 
166 See id. at 165. 
167 See Cox, supra note 14, at 497. 
168 Minsasosongbeob [Civil Procedure Act], Act No. 547, Apr. 4, 1960, amended 
by Act No. 13952, Feb. 3, 2016, art. 98 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/민사소송법 [https://perma.cc/EU3B-3XPC]. 
169 Id. 
170 See COFFEE, JR., supra note 160, at 166-67. 
171 Minsasosongbeob [Civil Procedure Act], Act No. 547, Apr. 4, 1960, amended 
by Act No. 13952, Feb. 3, 2016, art. 109 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/민사소송법 [https://perma.cc/EU3B-3XPC]. 
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to be awarded) to the counsel by the prevailing party.172  This cap 
may work as a device that mitigates the threat of punitive fee shift-
ing.173  Moreover, the cap allows plaintiff’s attorney to calculate the 
cost to be paid to the defendant in advance when deciding whether 
to bring suit. 
Lastly, the fee shifting rule will matter less if it is not actively 
enforced.  For the prevailing party to be reimbursed its legal fees in 
Korea, it must first file a claim requesting the court to calculate the 
amount to be shifted.174  So far, there has been no SCAA case decided 
against the plaintiff that has been subject to the calculation of legal 
fees.175 
Do prevailing parties’ legal fees actually get reimbursed by the 
losing parties in Korea?  It is difficult to gather data on the current 
practice of private negotiations being made between the parties.  But 
the SCK provides public annual statistics on decided civil cases and 
filings of claims for calculation of legal fees.  By comparing the civil 
cases which are decided with the filings for calculation of legal fees, 
I provide a rough proxy for the enforcement of the fee shifting 
rule.176  In Korea, the court of the first instance has decided 745,358 
cases in 2014.177  However, only 31,324 claims for calculation of legal 
                                                      
172 Byeonhosabosuuisosongbiyongsanipegwanhangyuchik [Rule on Calculat-
ing Attorney’s Fees in Litigation Cost], S. Ct. Rule No. 758, Feb. 28, 1981, amended 
by Rule No. 2496, Nov. 27, 2013, art. 3 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/변호사보수의소송비용산입에관한규칙 
[https://perma.cc/X7AW-GJLW]. 
173 See COFFEE, JR., supra note 160, at 165-66. 
174 Minsasosongbeob [Civil Procedure Act], Act No. 547, Apr. 4, 1960, amended 
by Act No. 13952, Feb. 3, 2016, art. 110 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/민사소송법 [https://perma.cc/EU3B-3XPC]. 
175 There has been only one case where certification was denied of which the 
plaintiff decided not to appeal against one defendant out of two defendants.  The 
case against the appealed defendant has been overturned in appeal.  Because the 
case against one defendant had not been appealed, the case between the plaintiff 
and the defendant who was not appealed against has ended.  But so far, I have not 
found any evidence that any defendant who technically won a case file for the cal-
culation of legal fees. 
176 This comparison will not be completely accurate because of the following 
reasons.  First, it will not account for private settlement of legal fees.  Second, civil 
cases decided may be appealed to be settled at the appellate court.  When the case 
settles, each party typically pays for its own legal fees.  Third, the prevailing party 
may decide not to take any enforcement action on the losing party even after the 
legal fee calculation is made. 
177 SUPREME COURT OF KOREA, SABEOBYEONGAM [Annual Judicial Statistics] 736 
(2015). 
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fees have been filed in 2014.178  Although the prevailing party may 
only choose to pursue legal fees when the amount-at-stake is high 
enough to be worth pursuing, the enforcement of the loser pays rule 
does not seem to be a common practice, which could mean that the 
loser pays rule may currently work even less as a deterrent. 
 
6.2.3.  Discovery System 
 
The lack of a discovery system may work as a barrier to the ag-
gressive pursuit of class actions.179  In the United States, the discov-
ery process allows for ease in gathering evidence and proving com-
plex factual matters.180  In Korea, there is no such discovery process. 
However, other tools supplement the lack of a discovery system 
in Korea.  First, the court may order, with or without a petition by 
the parties, a person who has documents related to the lawsuit, to 
submit them, subject to certain restrictions.181  The SCAA also allows 
the court to investigate evidence without a petition by the parties, 
when the court finds it necessary.182 
Second, as we have seen above, the courts in Korea do not re-
quire the plaintiff to prove market efficiency in the class certification 
stage.  Since the plaintiff in the United States must prove that the 
market was efficient at the class certification stage, it can be said that 
it is easier for plaintiffs in Korea to file a class action, regardless of 
the presence of a discovery system. 
Third, Article 162 accounts for the lack of a discovery process.  
As we have seen, most U.S. Rule 10b-5 class actions allege misrepre-
sentation in the financial statement.183  In this sense, Article 162 may 
be more comparable to Rule 10b-5 rather than the catch-all provision 
                                                      
178 Id. at 773. 
179 See Warren III, supra note 13, at 1083-84 (2012). 
180 See COFFEE, JR., supra note 160, at 200. 
181 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action 
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 32 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JY-
NSLW]. 
182 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action 
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 30 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JY-
NSLW]. 
183 Cornerstone Research, supra note 74, at 8. 
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in Article 179.184  And Article 162, which is a rule about misrepre-
sentation of material facts in the Business reports that should be sub-
mitted to the Financial Services Commission, does not require the 
plaintiff to prove reliance.185 
Moreover, Article 162 does not require the plaintiff to prove sci-
enter, but instead requires the defendant to prove that she was una-
ble to know such facts were misrepresented although she exercised 
reasonable care.186  This is a functional equivalent of shifting the bur-
den to the defendant to disprove scienter in a Rule 10b-5 class action. 
Also, the SCK has held that the defendant has the burden to 
prove that the misrepresentation did not cause the loss in a non-class 
action Article 162 case.187  The SCK allowed the defendant to use 
event studies to disprove loss causation, but held that the defendant 
does not meet her burden by showing a result that says it cannot be 
said with certainty that the movement of stock price was caused by 
the correction of misrepresentation.188 
Lastly, there are also special considerations regarding damages 
calculations.  Specifically, the SCAA makes it clear that the court 
may use various means, including the use of statistical methods, 
when it is difficult to calculate the exact amount of damages.189  
Moreover, Article 162 specifies formulas for the presumption of 
damages.190  The presumptive amount of damages is calculated by 
the difference between the amount actually paid or received by the 
plaintiff, and (1) the market price of the securities at the date of the 
closing of the trial proceedings if the securities is not sold, or (2) the 
                                                      
184 See Hwa-Jin Kim, Jeunggwonsosongeseoui ingwagwangyeironui jaejomyeong 
[Rethinking Causation in Securities Fraud Litigations], 144 JEOSEUTISEU 209, 210-11 
(2014) (explaining the impact of the fraud-on-the-market theory on Article 162). 
185 See id. at 210. 
186 Japonsijanggwa geumyungtujaeope gwanhan beobryul [Financial Invest-
ment Services and Capital Markets Act], Act No. 8635, Aug. 3, 2007, amended by Act. 
No. 14817, Apr. 18, 2017, art. 162 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/자본시장과금융투자업에관한법률 
[https://perma.cc/KY7H-Y9HJ]. 
187 S. Ct., 2014Da207283, Jan. 29, 2015 (S. Kor.). 
188 S. Ct., 2008Da92336, Aug. 19, 2010 (S. Kor.). 
189 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action 
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 34 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JY-
NSLW]. 
190 KIM, supra note 2, at 73. 
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price at the time of the sale of the securities.191  Because of these pro-
visions, proving damages for plaintiffs in Korean securities class ac-
tions may not be relatively difficult, as compared to U.S. counter-
parts.192  And considering the factors above, the lack of the discovery 
process may not be the conclusive cause for the lack of class actions 
in Korea. 
 
6.2.4.  Civil Juries 
 
The availability of civil juries may also affect the behavior of 
plaintiff’s counsel in securities class action.  The reason may be that 
fact-finding decisions made by civil juries are generally more unpre-
dictable as compared to the decisions made by professional 
judges.193  Another reason may be that juries could favor investors 
alleging loss over publicly-traded corporations.194  For this reason, 
there could be more incentive to initiate a securities class action 
when civil juries are provided.195 
While there are civil juries in the United States, there are no such 
civil juries in Korea.196  But the lack of civil juries would not com-
pletely deter filings of class actions.  The Delaware Chancery Court, 
                                                      
191 Japonsijanggwa geumyungtujaeope gwanhan beobyul [Financial Invest-
ment Services and Capital Markets Act], Act No. 8635, Aug. 3, 2007, amended by Act 
No. 14817, Apr. 18, 2017, art. 162 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/자본시장과금융투자업에관한법률 
[https://perma.cc/KY7H-Y9HJ]. 
192 See Seoungwan Hahm, Jeunggwongwanryeonjipdansosongui jinhaengkwa 
kwanryunhan myeot gaji jaenjeomdl [Some Issues Regarding SCAA Process], 43 BFL 69, 
75 (2010) (noting that it is relatively easy to calculate damages when the securities 
are sold before the date of the closing of the trial proceedings).  Contra Hwanbong 
Byun, Jeunggwongwanryeonjipdansosongbeobui silje unyongkwajeongeseoui moonjejeom 
[Technical Problems of the SCAA], in JEUNGGWONGWANRYEONJIPDANSOSONGBEOB 
GAEJEONGRON [REFORMING SCAA] 166, 180 (Seoul Bar Ass’n Legal Research Inst. ed., 
2014) (arguing that it is technically not possible to prove the market price of the 
securities at the date of the closing of the proceeding before the end of the trial on 
such date). 
193 See COFFEE, JR., supra note 160, at 200. 
194 See Warren III, supra note 13, at 1087. 
195 See id. at 1086-87. 
196 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VII, with Beobwonjojikbeob [Court Organiza-
tion Act], Act No. 51, Sept. 26, 1949, amended by Act No. 14470, Dec. 27, 2016, art. 7 
(S. Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/법원조직법 [https://perma.cc/CQ5M-
F8WH]. 
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a non-jury trial court, has attracted over seventy cases of merger lit-
igation every year between 2005 and 2011.197  As long as there are 
merits and economic incentives, the plaintiff or plaintiff’s counsel 
will be willing to file, even though the fact-finders are not less so-
phisticated civil juries, but professional judges. 
 
7.  RULE ON FILING FEES (AND FEE SHIFTING) 
 
One factor that may not be deeply considered when deciding 
whether to file a class action claim in the United States is the filing 
fee amount.  In the United States, the filing fee for a class action in 
federal court is currently flat.198  Because the filing fee does not esca-
late with a function of the aggregate amount-at-stake, the filing fee 
that the plaintiff or plaintiff’s counsel should bear in a class action is 
quite nominal.199 
In Korea, the filing fee escalates gradually as a function of the 
amount-at-stake.200  If the filing fee becomes high, it could work as 
an entry barrier.201  But there is a ceiling to the filing fee in the SCAA, 
                                                      
197 See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dy-
namics of State Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 475 (2015) (providing 
data on merger litigation over the period 2005 through 2011). 
198 See Deborah R Hensler, The United States of America, in THE COSTS AND 
FUNDING OF CIVIL LITIGATION 535, 539 (Christopher Hodges, Stefan Vogenauer & 
Magdalena Tulibacka eds., 2010) (explaining that the filing fees of the U.S. federal 
and state courts are generally flat). 
199 I thank Professor Fisch for pointing this out to me. 
200 See Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Ac-
tion Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 7 
(S. Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 
[https://perma.cc/D2JY-NSLW]; Minsasosong deung injibeob [Act on the Stamps 
Attached for Civil Litigation, etc.], Act No. 337, Sept. 9,1954, amended by Act No. 
12892, Dec. 30, 2014, art. 2 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/민사소송등인지법 [https://perma.cc/5VEJ-LLK2]. 
201 See Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 171 (1997) (noting that filing fees and amount-in-con-
troversy requirements may serve as entry barriers which prevent the litigation of 
some claims); see also Michael M. Karayanni, The Class Action Experience in Israel and 
the Value of Having a Representative with a Personal Claim, in CROSS-BORDER CLASS 
ACTIONS: THE EUROPEAN WAY 189, 195 (Arnaud Nuyts & Nikitas E. Hatzimihail eds., 
2014) (noting that in an escalating filing fee regime the amount of the filed claim in 
a class action “can easily reach substantial amounts thereby making the fees the 
plaintiff must pay very significant”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
  
280 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:1 
set at 50 million won.202  So if the amount-at-stake is sufficiently 
high, then the filing fee will become flat.  This rule gives the entre-
preneurial attorney an incentive to identify and pursue cases with a 
high amount-at-stake. 
But the filing fee rule has a deterring effect on the lead plaintiff.  
In Korea, the amount-at-stake used for the calculation of the filing 
fee is not the amount-at-stake of the lead plaintiff, but of the whole 
class.203  So the lead plaintiff will have to pay the filing fee for not 
only herself, but also for other class members, in a class action.  This 
may not be an issue, if we consider that when an entrepreneurial 
attorney takes the case on a contingent fee basis, she may be willing 
to pay the filing fee for the plaintiffs.204  Because the contingent fee 
she will receive is calculated not by the amount recovered by the 
lead plaintiff, but by the amount recovered for the whole class, cal-
culation of the filing fee for the whole class may not be over-inclu-
sive if the fee is ultimately borne by the entrepreneurial attorney.  It 
can even be said that the mechanism has been formulated with the 
entrepreneurial attorney in mind, since it deters individual plaintiffs 
from actively pursuing a class action claim without an entrepreneur-
ial attorney. 
The entrepreneurial attorney may contract with the lead plaintiff 
to reimburse the plaintiff in the event of a loss.205  But even assuming 
that this kind of contract is allowed,206 the lead plaintiff would have 
                                                      
202 Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action 
Act], Act No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, Feb. 27, 2013, art. 7 (S. 
Kor.), http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JY-
NSLW]. 
203 Id. 
204 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 17, at 683 (“But unless the client is willing to invest 
in the action by bearing litigation expenses, the attorney will still make the critical 
investment decision, thereby reversing the normal roles of principal and agent.”). 
205 It is difficult to find any discussion about whether this kind of contract is 
legal and/or ethical in Korea.  The legality or ethicality of the contract has not been 
an issue because presumably such a contract is scarce.  Korea does not have a his-
tory of entrepreneurial attorney, so the attorney will not be willing to make such a 
contract.  Discussions about professional ethics in the class action context focus on 
advancing legal costs and contingency fee clauses.  See, e.g., Changwan Son, Ji-
pdangihoegsosongui beobjeok moonje – byunhosa yunrireul joongsimeuro [Legal Issues in 
Entrepreneurial Class Action – Concentrating on Professional Responsibility], 54 BFL 6, 
15 (2012) (arguing that the lack of an explicit statute provision shows that advanc-
ing legal costs does not violate professional responsibility); id. at 17-19 (discussing 
the ethical boundaries of contingency arrangements). 
206 See S. Ct., 2013Da28728, July 24, 2014 (S. Kor.) (holding that contract where 
a third party agrees to fund legal costs with the other party agreeing to repay the 
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to first assume the liability at the event of the loss.  So, the lead plain-
tiff risks the plaintiff’s attorney becoming judgment proof.207 
According to the Korean fee shifting rule, the fee to be shifted 
escalates as the amount-at-stake goes up.208  The lead plaintiff would 
risk paying the legal fees calculated by not only the amount-at-stake 
for herself but also the amount-at-stake for the other class mem-
bers.209  This rule may also potentially make class action uneconom-
ical for the lead plaintiff.210 
However, as discussed above, the fee shifting rule is not actively 
enforced in Korea.211  Also, a judgment-proof plaintiff may still serve 
                                                      
legal cost after the dispute is resolved is unenforceable if the third party also acted 
as the actual party of the dispute); S. Ct., 2014Da18322, July 10, 2014 (implying with-
out deciding that a contract where the plaintiff’s attorney agrees to advance legal 
costs for the plaintiff is not illegal). In Canada, an indemnity agreement by the 
plaintiff’s counsel is allowed.  WARREN K. WINKLER ET AL., THE LAW OF CLASS 
ACTIONS IN CANADA 387 (2014) (noting that indemnity agreements between the 
plaintiff and the plaintiff’s counsel became a norm of class action practice). In the 
United States, states are split on whether a plaintiff’s attorney may agree to indem-
nify the plaintiff of adverse costs.  Compare Oklahoma Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics 
Comm., Op. 323 (2009), http://ethics.okbar.org/EthicsCounsel/EthicsOpin-
ions/Opinion323.aspx [https://perma.cc/S8N6-Y63M] (“An Attorney may not 
agree to indemnify his client against attorney’s fees and costs in the event that such 
fees and costs are awarded to the opposing party and taxed as costs against the 
client.”) (emphasis in original), with Alaska Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 2004-02 
(2004), https://www.alaskabar.org/servlet/content/indexes_aeot__2004_2.html 
[https://perma.cc/RT4W-C8HR] (allowing the plaintiff’s attorney to agree with 
the plaintiff to assume responsibility for a client’s adverse attorney award in the 
event that an appeal taken is unsuccessful). 
207 See John C. Coffee, Jr., “Loser Pays”: The Latest Installment in the Battle-
Scarred, Cliff-Hanging Survival of the Rule 10b-5 Class Action, 68 S.M.U. L. REV. 689, 
699 (2015) (noting that even if the law firm serving as class counsel can indemnify 
its client’s fee-shifting losses, the law firm may become insolvent and unable to 
pay). 
208 See footnote 172 and accompanying text. 
209 See Hongki Kim, Urinara Jeunggwongwanryeonjipdansosongui Hyunhwangkwa 
Kaeseonkwaje [Improving Ways of Securities Class Action Suit in Korea], 11 
KYUNGJEBEOBYEONGU 59, 82 (2012) (arguing that a Korean investor will not have any 
incentive to file a class action because the investor gains little when she wins but 
pays a lot in legal fees when she loses). 
210 Assume that the lead plaintiff has one dollar at stake, and there are 100 class 
members with each class member having the same 1 dollar at stake.  For sake of 
simplicity, also assume that the fee shifting rule allows ten cents to be shifted for 
every dollar.  In this case, the lead plaintiff will recover one dollar if she wins, but 
will have to pay ten dollars if she loses in a class action. 
211 See footnote 174-78 and accompanying text. 
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as a lead plaintiff.212  Lastly, there is the possibility of improper coun-
seling by the attorney, to the potential plaintiff, about the risk in-
volved at the time of the filing.213  So, the potential risk of fee shifting 
may matter less when compared to the filing fee that should gener-
ally be paid upfront.214 
The filing fee rule also deters the entrepreneurial attorney from 
using the class action.  That is because the entrepreneurial attorney 
must pay the filing fee paid upfront if she chooses to pay the filing 
for the class.215216 
It is interesting to note that some plaintiff’s attorneys began to 
file a class action alleging initially only a relatively small amount-at-
stake, that is 100,000,000 won,217 with a promise to expand the 
amount-at-stake at a later date.218  The rationale given for this kind 
                                                      
212 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 207, at 699 (“Ironically, the one party who could 
rationally serve as a lead plaintiff under a ‘loser pays’ rule will be the judgment-
proof, nominal plaintiff with no assets.”). 
213 See Garry D. Watson, Class Actions: The Canadian Experience, 11 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 269, 275 (2001) (noting the possibility of improper counseling 
about the risk involved by Canadian plaintiff class counsels to representative plain-
tiffs). 
214 The plaintiff’s attorney can try to mitigate the impact of the fee shifting rule 
by splitting the claim.  See Stephen B. Burbank, All the World His Stage, 52 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 741, 758-60 (2004) (reviewing ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN, THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF ADJUDICATORY AUTHORITY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003)) (ex-
plaining the German practice of claim splitting). 
215 See Karayanni, supra note 201, at 195-96 (arguing that fees might prove to 
be a real obstacle for class actions if payment of the filing fee in advance is required 
when filing a class action in an escalating filing fee regime); see also Coffee, Jr., supra 
note 99, at 1915 (noting the upfront costs as a “procedural law [that] may to a degree 
undercut the announced purpose of [SCAA]”). 
216 The amount of the shifted fee in the event of a loss may also deter the plain-
tiff’s lawyer if the plaintiff demands that the lawyer indemnify the plaintiff.  
WARREN K. WINKLER ET AL., supra note 206, at 413 (“An indemnity agreement, how-
ever, simply shifts the threat of the adverse costs award unto class counsel, who 
may be sufficiently intimidated by the exposure to costs to decline to take on the 
case in the first place.”). 
217 This amount is approximately 87,308 U.S. dollars calculated by the currency 
exchange rate of 1,145.37 won per one U.S. dollar as of October 31, 2016.  For data 
on currency exchange rate as of October 31, 2016, see FED. RES. SYS., supra note 111. 
218 See, e.g., Seoul Western Dist. Ct., Jeunggwongwanryeonjipdansosongui sojegi 
gonggo [Notice on Filing of Securities-related Class Action] (Jan. 28, 2016), 
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/160128_slseobu.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RPF5-8A8F].  It is difficult to know whether the plaintiff’s coun-
sel has raised the amount-at-stake after the filing of the cases because most of the 
cases are still pending at the class certification stage or have just reached trial stage.  
See appendix B.  If the court allows the amount-at-stake to be raised after the class 
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of action is that the scope of the class is not determined at the initial 
filing of the complaint.219  This practice has the practical effect of 
lowering the amount of the filing fee the plaintiff must submit up-
front, causing it to become even lower than the flat filing fee prac-
ticed in the United States.220  And because the cap for legal fee shift-
ing is calculated by a function of the amount-at-stake, this practice 
may also limit the amount of legal fees to be shifted. 
In another case, the complaint was filed with over 1,000 plaintiffs 
as lead plaintiffs.221  The law firm representing this case gave notice 
on its website requesting that the plaintiffs submit a certain amount 
for payment of the filing fee.222 
Because the filing fee deters class action filings, a few proposals 
have been made.  One scholar has suggested lowering the cap on 
filing fees, arguing that the government should subsidize class ac-
tions since they have a deterrent effect on corporate misconduct.223  
Another has suggested using a flat filing fee for class actions.224  Both 
                                                      
certification, then the plaintiff’s counsel will be able to lever up the stake after the 
class certification issue has been settled. 
219 See, e.g., Seoul Southern Dist. Ct., Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongui sojegi 
gonggo [Notice on Filing of Securities Related Class Action] (Dec. 2, 2013), 
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/131202_slnambu.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9MSB-Z9CR]. 
220 The filing fee for the amount-at-stake of 100,000,000 won is 47,500 won.  See 
Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongbeob [Securities-related Class Action Act], Act 
No. 7074, Jan. 20, 2004, amended by Act No. 11845, May 28, 2013, art. 7 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.law.go.kr/법령/증권관련집단소송법 [https://perma.cc/D2JY-
NSLW].  This amount is approximately 41 U.S. dollars calculated by the currency 
exchange rate of 1,145.37 won per one U.S. dollar as of October 31, 2016.  For data 
on currency exchange rate as of October 31, 2016, see FED. RES. SYS., supra note 111. 
221 Seoul Central Dist. Ct., 2014Ga-Hap31627 (S. Kor.), 
http://www.scourt.go.kr/img/notice/140626_seoul.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BRU9-9ZLW]. 
222  Jeongyul LLC, Jeunggwongwanryeonjipdansosong seoryu jechul mit 
sosongbiyong ibgeum anne [notice for class action documets collection and cost 
deposit] (Nov. 10, 2015), http://jeongyul.co.kr/this-is-a-blog-test/ 
[https://perma.cc/4G5X-6NZK] (requesting payments to cover the filing fee and 
other anticipated costs to the plaintiffs). 
223 Jung-Sik Choi, Jeunggwonjipdansosongjedoui hwalseonghwareul uihan jean 
[Proposal for the Invigoration of Securities Class Action System], 53 BEOBHAKYEONGU 
311, 326 (2014). 
224 See Hyojeong Im, Jeunggwongwanryeon jipdansosongui hwalseonghwa 
bangane gwanhan yeongu [A Study on How to Promote Securities-related Class 
Action], 147 (June 2015) (unpublished master’s thesis, on file with the Yonsei Uni-
versity Graduate School) (suggesting that a flat filing fee may be possible in a Ko-
rean class action context considering that a flat filing fee is already being used in 
certain administrative cases). 
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proposals will affect the incentives of the lead plaintiff and the en-
trepreneurial attorney because they will lower the cost the plaintiff 
or the plaintiff’s attorney must pay in the event of a loss.  However, 
they do not address the exact cap amount or flat fee amount. 
I propose using the alleged amount of the lead plaintiff’s 
amount-at-stake to calculate the filing fee and the fee to be shifted.225  
For a case to proceed as a class action, a flat fee will be separately 
required as a cost to be borne by the plaintiff’s attorney.226  This pro-
posal will have the following merits.  First, it will allow the plaintiff 
to consider only the merits of the class action without considering 
the difference in filing fee and the fee to be shifted between individ-
ual filing and class action filing.227  Second, it will effectively lower 
the filing fee, thus incentivizing the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s attor-
ney to use class action.  Third, by using the amount-at-stake of the 
lead plaintiff, it is possible to use the same formula that is used when 
calculating the filing fee for monetary claims. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
225 See Talia Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi, It’s for the Judges to Decide: Allocation of 
Trial Costs in Israel Report on Israel, in COST AND FEE ALLOCATION IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 
177, 183 (Mathias Reimann ed., 2012) (explaining that courts usually required class 
action plaintiffs to pay court fees only with respect to their personal claim in Israel 
as of 2012); see also Karayanni, supra note 201, at 196 (explaining that the Israeli Su-
preme Court held that only the individual amount claimed for the representative 
will be regarded as the amount of the action for fee purposes in class actions of 
aggregated monetary amounts). 
226 In Israel, the government charges a flat fee for class actions.  See Chen 
Ma’anit, Shaked Sets Fees to Stem Class Action Flood, GLOBES (Mar. 23, 2017, 6:19 PM), 
http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-shaked-sets-fees-to-stem-class-actions-flood-
1001182423 [https://perma.cc/X4GH-YAVV].  I thank Benjamin Weitz for alerting 
me to the recent change in Israel. 
227 If we use a flat fee for class action filing, the plaintiff will pay a filing fee 
calculated by the amount-at-stake if she files by herself but pay a flat fee when she 
files a class action.  So, the filing fee will affect the choice of the plaintiff.  Even if we 
lower the cap on filing fee, any amount that is above (or lower) the expected filing 
fee of an individual action will affect the choice of the plaintiff whether to file a class 
action or not. 
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8.  CONCLUSION 
 
Opt-out type class action and contingency fee arrangements are 
considered to be some of the major mechanisms that allowed entre-
preneurial litigation to take hold in the United States.228  But consid-
ering the current practice in Korea, where the plaintiff’s counsels are 
not aggressively filing for class action even though both mecha-
nisms are present, other factors also seem to matter.  I do not assert 
that I have considered every variable in the civil procedure practices 
that could affect the outcome here. 
However, we should also note that while countries differ in law 
and practice, there may be some other legal mechanisms or practices 
which account for the present differences, to some extent.  For in-
stance, the lack of discovery could be accounted for by the substan-
tive law, which eliminates certain elements, or procedural law, 
which shifts the burden of proof for certain elements. 
It may be possible that the use of the SCAA will increase in Ko-
rea in the future.  The basic framework that allowed the class action 
to thrive in the United States is implemented in Korean civil proce-
dure, at least in the securities class action context.  And other mech-
anisms that could possibly deter entrepreneurial attorneys from 
pursuing securities class actions do not seem to be determinative.  
Korean law on class certification may be even more favorable to en-
trepreneurial attorneys in Korea when compared to their U.S. coun-
terparts. 
The Filing fee rule may be one hurdle that deters the plaintiff or 
the plaintiff’s attorney from using the securities class action in Ko-
rea.  The escalating filing fee that takes the amount-at-stake of the 
class members into account affects the incentives of the lead plaintiff 
and the lead plaintiff’s attorney.  By removing the other class mem-
bers’ amount-at-stake from the filing fee formula, it may be possible 
to incentivize the lead plaintiff and lead plaintiff’s attorney to use 
the class action. 
However, it should be noted that civil procedure is not the only 
factor that affects the actions of lead plaintiffs and entrepreneurial 
attorneys.  As noted earlier, social and economic situations, such as 
the size of the market capitalization of the listed corporations, may 
                                                      
228 See Coffee, Jr., supra note 153, at 217-18 (noting the effect of the class action 
and the contingent fee arrangement on the lawyer as an entrepreneur). 
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also affect their actions.229  To really understand the reason for the 
differences in the practice of class action, we may have to look be-
yond civil procedure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
229 See Choi, supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also Coffee, Jr., supra 
note 99, at 1925 (noting the Korean experience when arguing that legislation will 
not alone produce major change). 
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APPENDIX TABLE A230 
 
No. Case 
No. 
Date 
of 
Fil-
ing 
Plain-
tiff 
No. 
of  
Plain
tiffs 
Plaintiff’s  
attorney 
Defend-
ant 
Status 
1 Suwon 
Dist. 
Ct., 
2009Ga-
Hap882
9 
2009. 
4. 13. 
Park 
Yun-
pae, 
Seoul 
Invest-
ment 
Club, 
Inc. 
2 Lawyer Jo 
Yeongkil, 
Jo Nam-
taek, Ham 
Seungwan, 
Choi 
Soengjin, 
Park 
Sangbeom, 
Cheong 
Huiseon 
 
Jinseong 
TEC, 
Inc., Ma 
Young-
jin, Yoon 
Wuseok
231 
 
2010. 4. 30.  
Settled. 
2 Seoul 
Central 
Dist. 
Ct., 
2010Ga-
Hap160
4 
2010. 
1. 7. 
Yang 
Ilnam, 
Choi 
Young
mi 
2 Hannuri 
Law (Law-
yer in 
charge: 
Song 
Seonghyeo
n, Kim 
Sangwon, 
Kim 
Juyeong, 
Park Pilseo) 
Royal 
Bank of 
Canada 
2017. 2. 15.  
Settled. 
3 Seoul 
South-
ern 
Dist. 
Ct., 
2011Ga-
Hap193
87 
2011. 
10. 
13. 
Lee Jae-
hyeong 
et al. 
186 Hannuri 
Law (Law-
yer in 
Charge: 
Song 
Eonghyeon, 
Kim Sang-
won, Kim 
Juyeong) 
DONGB
U Securi-
ties Co., 
Ltd., 
Trustee 
of Ssimo-
tek Park 
Younggu
232 
Pending in 
the court of 
first in-
stance. 
 
                                                      
230 Summarized by the Author using the data in the Supreme Court of Korea 
website (www.scourt.go.kr). 
 231 Case against Ma Youngjin has been voluntarily dismissed on August 21, 
2009, and case against Yoon Wuseok has been voluntarily dismissed on January 18, 
2010.  
 232 Case against Trustee of Ssimotek Park Younggu has been voluntarily dis-
missed on March 8, 2012.   
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4 Seoul 
South-
ern 
Dist. Ct. 
2011Ga-
Hap230
03 
2011 
11. 
25. 
Yang Il 
Nam, 
Choi 
Young
mi 
2 Hannuri 
Law (Law-
yer in 
charge: 
Song 
Seonghyeo
n, Kim 
Sangwon, 
Kim 
Juyeong, 
Park Pilseo, 
Jeon 
Youngjun) 
HANH
WA 
INVEST
MENT & 
SECURI
TIES 
CO., 
LTD. 
Consoli-
dated to 
Seoul Cen-
tral Dist. Ct., 
2010Ga-
Hap1604 
and given a 
new case 
number of 
Seoul Cen-
tral Dist. Ct., 
2012Ga-
Hap509676. 
5 Seoul 
Central 
Dist. 
Ct., 
2012Ga-
Hap170
61 
2012. 
3. 2. 
Kim 
Soonde
ok et al. 
5 Hannuri 
Law (Law-
yer in 
charge: 
Song 
Seonghyeo
n, Kim 
Sangwon, 
Kim 
Juyeong, 
Park Pilseo, 
Jeon 
Youngjun) 
Korea In-
vestment 
& Securi-
ties Co., 
Ltd., 
Deutsche 
Bank 
AG233 
Judgement 
for the 
plaintiff. 
6 Seoul 
Central 
Dist. 
Ct., 
2013Ga-
Hap743
13 
2013. 
10. 8. 
Kim 
Taeeun
g et al. 
15 Hannuri 
Law (Law-
yer in 
charge: 
Song 
Seonghyeo
n, Kim 
Sangwon, 
Kim 
Juyeong, 
Jeon 
Youngjun) 
GS Engi-
neering 
& Con-
struction 
Corp. 
Pending in 
the court of 
first in-
stance. 
7 Seoul 
South-
ern 
Dist. 
Ct., 
2013Ga-
Hap107
585, 
2014Ga-
Hap100
2013. 
11. 
25. 
Kim 
Jiwun 
1 Geonjin 
Law (Law-
yer in 
charge: 
Park Pilseo) 
Yul Law 
(Lawyer in 
charge: 
Byun 
Jang 
Chul 
Pending in 
the court of 
first in-
stance. 
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086 & 
100093 
(con-
sol.) 
Hwan-
bong) 
8 Seoul 
West-
ern 
Dist. 
Ct., 
2013Ga-
Hap358
56 
2013. 
11. 
26. 
Kim 
Jiwun 
1 Geonjin 
Law (Law-
yer in 
charge: 
Park Pilseo) 
Yul Law 
(Lawyer in 
charge: 
Byun 
Hwan-
bong) 
Yu 
Wangdo
n 
Consoli-
dated to 
Seoul South-
ern Dist. Ct., 
2013Ga-
Hap107585 
and given a 
new case 
number of 
Seoul South-
ern Dist. Ct., 
2014Ga-
Hap100086. 
9 Suwon 
Dist. 
Ct., 
2013Ga-
Hap264
04 
2013. 
11. 
26. 
Kim 
Jiwun 
1 Geonjin 
Law (Law-
yer in 
charge: 
Park Pilseo) 
Yul Law 
(Lawyer in 
charge: 
Byun 
Hwan-
bong) 
Jin Ma-
trix, Co., 
Ltd. 
Consoli-
dated to 
Seoul South-
ern Dist. Ct., 
2013Ga-
Hap107585 
and given a 
new case 
number of 
Seoul South-
ern Dist. Ct., 
2014Ga-
Hap100093. 
10 Seoul 
Central 
Dist. 
Ct., 
2014Ga-
Hap316
27 
2014. 
6. 13. 
Seo 
Wonil 
et al. 
1254 Jeongyul 
LLC (Law-
yer in 
charge: 
Kim Hak 
Sung, Lee Ji 
Ho, Jeon 
Jong Won, 
Kim Seok 
Bae, Lee 
Hae Wook, 
Woo-Jung 
Jon, Hwang 
Yunjeong, 
Park Dong 
Won, Jung 
Jae Seop) 
Yuanta 
Securi-
ties (Ko-
rea) Co., 
Ltd. et al. 
Pending in 
the court of 
first in-
stance. 
 
11 Seoul 
Central 
Dist. Ct. 
2014Ga-
2014. 
6. 10. 
Kang 
Jonggu 
et al. 
20 Jeongyul 
LLC (Law-
yer in 
charge: Lee 
Dae Soon, 
Park Seo 
Yuanta 
Securi-
ties (Ko-
rea) Co., 
Ltd. et al. 
Pending in 
the court of 
first in-
stance. 
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Hap301
50 
Jin, Park 
Hwiyeong, 
Mun Che-
olju, Kim 
Jee Eun, 
Baek 
Seungjae) 
Lawyer Jin 
Cheol 
12 Seoul 
Central 
Dist. Ct. 
2015Ga-
Hap904
7 
2015. 
3. 27. 
Kim 
Hui-
dong et 
al.  
6 Youngjin 
LLC (Law-
yer in 
charge: Yu 
Kyungjae, 
Kwak 
Wonkon, 
Mun Jin O 
STX Off-
shore & 
Ship-
building 
Co., Ltd. 
et al.  
Pending in 
the court of 
first in-
stance. 
13 Seoul 
West-
ern 
Dist. 
Ct., 
2016Ga-
Hap304
18 
2016. 
1. 19. 
Lee 
Junsik 
1 Hannuri 
Law (Law-
yer in 
charge: 
Kim Sang-
won, Kim 
Juyeong, 
Song 
Seonghyeo
n, Park Pil-
seo, Kim 
Jeongeun, 
Im Jim-
seong, Goo 
Hyunjoo) 
Samil 
Account-
ing Corp.  
 
Pending in 
the court of 
first in-
stance. 
 
 
APPENDIX TABLE B234 
 
No. 
Case Number 
for Trial 
Case number for class certification Status 
1 
Suwon Dist. 
Ct., 2009Ga-
Hap8829 
Suwon Dist. Ct., 2009Ka-Gi1048, 
Jan. 21, 2010 
 Certified 
2 
Seoul Central 
Dist. Ct., 
2010Ga-
Seoul Central Dist. Ct.,2010Ka-
Gi9474 & 2012Ka-gi2082 (consol.), 
May 1, 2012 
Certifica-
tion Denied 
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Hap1604 & 
2012Ga-
Hap509676 
Seoul High Ct., 2012Ra764 & 765 
(consol.), May 31, 2013 
Affirmed 
S. Ct., 2013Ma1052 & 1053 (consol.), 
Apr. 9, 2015 
Reversed to 
be re-
manded 
Seoul High Ct., 2015Ra656 & 657 
(consol.), Nov. 16, 2015 
Certified 
S. Ct., 2015Ma2056 & 2057 (consol.), 
Mar. 28, 2016 
Affirmed 
3 
Seoul South-
ern Dist. Ct., 
2011Ga-
Hap19387 
Seoul Southern Dist. Ct.,2011Ka-
Gi2010, Sept. 27, 2013 
Certified 
Seoul High Ct., 2013Ra20093, Feb. 6, 
2015 
Affirmed 
S. Ct., 2015Ma4027, Nov. 4, 2016 Affirmed 
4 
Seoul Central 
Dist. Ct., 
2012Ga-
Hap17061 
Seoul Central Dist. Ct., 2012Ka-
Gi1273, Sept. 3, 2013 
Certified 
Seoul High Ct., 2013Ra1426, Jan. 13, 
2014 
Reversed 
S. Ct., 2014Ma188, Apr. 9, 2015 
Reversed to 
be re-
manded 
Seoul High Ct., 2015Ra619, Jan. 29, 
2016 
Affirmed 
S. Ct., 2016Ma251, May 27, 2016 Affirmed 
5 
Seoul Central 
Dist. Ct., 
2013Ga-
Hap74313 
Seoul Central Dist. Ct., 2013Ka-
Gi6824, Feb. 12, 2015 
Certified 
Seoul High Ct., 2015Ra539, Jan. 29, 
2016 
Affirmed 
S. Ct. 2016Ma253, June 10, 2016 Affirmed 
6 
Seoul South-
ern Dist. Ct., 
2013Ga-
Hap107585, 
2014Ga-
Hap100086 & 
100093 (con-
sol.) 
Seoul Southern Dist. Ct., 2013Ka-
Gi2787, 2014Ka-Gi10064 & 10065 
(consol.) 
Pending 
7 
Seoul Central 
Dist. Ct., 
Seoul Central Dist. Ct., 2014Ka-
Gi3556, Sept. 29, 2016   
Certifica-
tion Denied 
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2014Ga-
Hap31627 Seoul High Ct., 2016Ra21279, Aug. 
4, 2017 
Affirmed 
S. Ct. 2017Ma5883 Pending 
8 
Seoul Central 
Dist. Ct. 
2014Ga-
Hap30150 
Seoul Central Dist. Ct., 
2014Ka-Gi3443 
Pending 
9 
Seoul Central 
Dist. Ct., 
2015Ga-
Hap9047 
Seoul Central Dist. Ct., 2015Ka-
Gi1755 
Pending 
10 
Seoul West-
ern Dist. Ct., 
2016Ga-
Hap30418 
Seoul Western Dist. Ct., 2016Ka-
Gi44 
Pending 
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